Fix a 64-bit cleanliness bug in how we read and write credentials to and from
v4 ticket files which is harmless if we don't care about interop with KTH krb4,
which we do care about.
--- krb5-1.3.1/src/lib/krb4/tf_util.c	2003-09-05 17:06:19.000000000 -0400
+++ krb5-1.3.1/src/lib/krb4/tf_util.c	2003-09-05 17:06:14.000000000 -0400
@@ -524,7 +524,7 @@
 {
     KTEXT   ticket = &c->ticket_st;	/* pointer to ticket */
     int     k_errno;
-    long issue_date;
+    KRB4_32 issue_date;
 
     if (fd < 0) {
 	if (krb_debug)
@@ -719,6 +719,7 @@
 #ifdef TKT_SHMEM
     int	    *skey_check;
 #endif /* TKT_SHMEM */
+    KRB4_32 issue_date_32;
 
     if (fd < 0) {		/* fd is ticket file as set by tf_init */
 	  if (krb_debug)
@@ -777,8 +778,9 @@
     if (write(fd, (char *) (ticket->dat), count) != count)
 	goto bad;
     /* Issue date */
-    if (write(fd, (char *) &issue_date, sizeof(long))
-	!= sizeof(long))
+    issue_date_32 = issue_date;
+    if (write(fd, (char *) &issue_date_32, sizeof(issue_date_32))
+	!= sizeof(issue_date_32))
 	goto bad;
 
     /* Actually, we should check each write for success */